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Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives 1987 book

Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Details Of The Book

Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Authors: , , ,   
ISBN : 9783540516750, 9783642750601 
publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 
publish year: 1987 
pages: 538 
language: English 
ebook format : PDF (It will be converted to PDF, EPUB OR AZW3 if requested by the user) 
file size: 25 MB 

price : $7.8 10 With 22% OFF

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You can Download Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives Book After Make Payment, According to the customer's request, this book can be converted into PDF, EPUB, AZW3 and DJVU formats.

Abstract Of The Book

Table Of Contents

Front Matter....Pages I-XVIII
Prologue....Pages 1-2
Agent and Principal....Pages 3-37
Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information....Pages 39-59
Risk Sharing and Subcontracting....Pages 61-79
Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems....Pages 81-92
Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts....Pages 93-103
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods....Pages 105-116
Incentives to Forecast Honestly....Pages 117-133
Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues....Pages 135-166
The Liquidation Decision as a Principal Agent Problem....Pages 167-177
On Stakeholders’ Unanimity....Pages 179-204
Signalling and Market Behavior....Pages 205-227
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information....Pages 229-253
Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis....Pages 255-280
The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting....Pages 281-309
Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation....Pages 311-326
Auditing in an Agency Setting....Pages 327-346
Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information....Pages 347-377
Managers as Principals and Agents....Pages 379-388
Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations....Pages 389-414
Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach....Pages 415-438
Managerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm....Pages 439-459
Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making....Pages 461-471
A Note on Fair Equality of Rules....Pages 473-480
Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets....Pages 481-494
Agency Costs are not a “Flop”!....Pages 495-509
Back Matter....Pages 511-534

First 10 Pages Of the book

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