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Economics and the Theory of Games 2003 book

Economics and the Theory of Games

Details Of The Book

Economics and the Theory of Games

Category: Economy
edition: illustrated edition 
Authors:   
serie:  
ISBN : 9780521772518, 0521772516 
publisher: Cambridge University Press 
publish year: 2003 
pages: 526 
language: English 
ebook format : PDF (It will be converted to PDF, EPUB OR AZW3 if requested by the user) 
file size: 7 MB 

price : $14.45 17 With 15% OFF



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You can Download Economics and the Theory of Games Book After Make Payment, According to the customer's request, this book can be converted into PDF, EPUB, AZW3 and DJVU formats.


Abstract Of The Book



Table Of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 13
1.1 Introduction and examples......Page 15
1.2.1 Formalization......Page 18
1.2.2 Examples......Page 22
1.3.1 Formalization......Page 26
1.3.2 Examples......Page 28
1.4 Mixed extension of a game......Page 30
1.5.1 Formal relationship......Page 32
1.5.2 Perfect recall and strategic equivalence......Page 35
1.6 Representation of a game in coalitional form......Page 37
Exercises......Page 40
2.1 Dominance and iterative dominance......Page 44
2.2.1 Formalization and discussion......Page 49
2.2.2 Examples......Page 54
2.2.3 Existence: informal discussion......Page 57
2.3 Zero-sum bilateral games......Page 59
2.4 Nash equilibrium: formal existence results......Page 64
2.5 Strong and coalition-proof equilibria......Page 67
2.6 Correlated equilibrium......Page 70
2.7 Rationalizability......Page 75
Summary......Page 82
Exercises......Page 83
3.1.1 Cournot model......Page 86
3.1.2 Bertrand model......Page 92
3.2 Mechanism design (I): efficient allocation of public goods......Page 97
3.2.1 Subscription mechanism......Page 99
3.2.2 An efficient mechanism......Page 100
3.3.1 Formulation of the design problem......Page 104
3.3.2 Partial characterization......Page 107
3.4 Markets (I): macroeconomic coordination failures......Page 113
Summary......Page 118
Exercises......Page 119
4.2 Refinements excluding “incredible threats”: examples......Page 124
4.3 Subgame-perfect equilibrium......Page 129
4.4 Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium......Page 131
4.5 Refinements excluding “untenable beliefs”: examples......Page 134
4.5.1 Deviations interpreted as mistakes......Page 135
4.5.2 Deviations interpreted as alternative theories......Page 137
4.5.3 Deviations interpreted as signals......Page 140
4.6 Sequential equilibrium......Page 142
4.7 Perfect and proper equilibria......Page 145
4.8 Strategic-form refinements......Page 149
Summary......Page 157
Exercises......Page 158
5.1.1 Stackelberg model......Page 165
5.1.2 Price competition under capacity constraints......Page 167
5.2.1 Bilateral strategic bargaining......Page 173
5.2.2 Strategic bargaining in a population context......Page 180
5.3 Oligopoly (III): differentiated products......Page 185
5.4 Mechanism design (III): efficient allocation of an indivisible object......Page 190
Summary......Page 196
Exercises......Page 198
6.1 Introduction and examples......Page 202
6.2 Bayesian games......Page 205
6.2.1 Harsanyi formalization......Page 206
6.2.2 Examples......Page 207
6.3.1 Formalization......Page 210
6.3.2 Examples......Page 212
6.4.1 Introduction and examples......Page 218
6.4.2 Formalization......Page 220
6.4.3 Signaling equilibrium......Page 222
6.4.4 Examples......Page 224
6.5 Mixed strategies, revisited: a purification approach......Page 231
6.6.1 Intuitive criterion: motivation......Page 235
6.6.2 A formal definition for signaling games......Page 237
Summary......Page 239
Exercises......Page 240
7.1 Markets (III): signaling in the labor market......Page 245
7.2 Markets (IV): insurance markets and adverse selection......Page 258
7.3.1 First-price auctions......Page 268
7.3.2 Optimal auction design: the revelation principle......Page 271
7.4.1 Double auctions......Page 281
7.4.2 The impossibility of efficient trade......Page 285
Summary......Page 289
Exercises......Page 290
8.1 Introduction and examples......Page 295
8.2 Repeated games: basic theoretical framework......Page 297
8.3.1 Infinite horizon......Page 300
8.3.2 Finite horizon......Page 305
8.4 Reputation and “irrationality”: informal discussion......Page 308
8.5.1 Infinite horizon......Page 314
8.5.2 Finite horizon......Page 320
8.6.1 A common time horizon......Page 325
8.6.2 Different time horizons......Page 329
Summary......Page 333
Exercises......Page 335
9.1.1 Perfect observation......Page 338
9.1.2 Imperfect observation......Page 343
9.2.1 Perfect observation......Page 348
9.2.2 Imperfect observation......Page 350
9.3 Markets (V): efficiency wages and unemployment......Page 355
9.3.1 Perfect observation......Page 358
9.3.2 Imperfect observation......Page 361
Summary......Page 365
Exercises......Page 366
10.1 Introduction......Page 369
10.2.1 Theoretical framework......Page 370
10.2.2 Evolutionarily stable strategy......Page 371
10.2.3 ESS and equilibrium......Page 372
10.2.4 Examples......Page 375
10.3.1 Replicator dynamics......Page 377
10.3.2 Replicator dynamics and equilibrium......Page 380
10.3.3 Examples......Page 384
10.4 Evolution in social environments......Page 386
10.4.1 Social evolutionary systems......Page 387
10.4.2 Payoff monotonicity and rationality......Page 391
10.4.3 Examples......Page 396
10.5 Evolution of cooperation: an example......Page 401
Summary......Page 407
Exercises......Page 408
11.1 Introduction......Page 412
11.2.1 Positive reinforcement and fixed aspirations......Page 413
11.2.2 General reinforcement and flexible aspirations......Page 420
11.3 Static perceptions and myopic behavior......Page 426
11.3.1 The strategic framework......Page 427
11.3.2 Learning by imitation......Page 428
11.3.3 Better- and best-response adjustment......Page 429
11.4 Memory, expectations, and foresight......Page 434
11.4.1 Fictitious play......Page 435
11.4.2 Smooth fictitious play......Page 441
11.4.3 Rational learning......Page 447
Summary......Page 455
Exercises......Page 456
12.1 Introduction......Page 460
12.2.2 Learning dynamics......Page 461
12.3.1 Bilateral coordination games......Page 463
12.3.2 Minimum-effort game......Page 465
12.3.3 Cournot oligopoly......Page 466
12.4 Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection......Page 467
12.4.1 Bilateral coordination games under global interaction......Page 468
12.4.2 Bilateral coordination games under local interaction......Page 476
12.4.3 Bilateral coordination games under centralized interaction......Page 478
12.4.4 Minimum-effort game......Page 480
12.4.5 Cournot oligopoly......Page 481
12.5 Experimental evidence......Page 484
12.5.1 Minimum-effort game......Page 485
12.5.2 Cournot oligopoly......Page 486
12.6.1 Markov chains......Page 488
12.6.2 A canonical model......Page 490
12.6.3 Stochastic stability and long-run dynamics......Page 491
12.6.4 Stochastic stability: mathematical techniques......Page 493
12.7 Reinforcement learning with flexible aspirations......Page 496
12.7.1 Prisoner’s dilemma......Page 499
12.7.2 Pure-coordination games......Page 504
12.7.3 Experimental evidence: prisoner’s dilemma......Page 506
Summary......Page 509
Exercises......Page 510
Bibliography......Page 515
Index......Page 521


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